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Abstract
Decisions to trust in strategic situations involve ambiguity (unknown probabilities). 
Despite many theoretical studies on ambiguity in game theory, empirical studies 
have lagged behind due to a lack of measurement methods, where separating ambi-
guity attitudes from beliefs is crucial. Baillon et  al. (Econometrica, 2018b) intro-
duced a method that allows for such a separation for individual choice. We extend 
this method to strategic situations and apply it to the trust game, providing new 
insights. People’s ambiguity attitudes and beliefs both matter for their trust deci-
sions. People who are more ambiguity averse decide to trust less, and people with 
more optimistic beliefs about others’ trustworthiness decide to trust more. How-
ever, people who are more a-insensitive (insufficient discrimination between dif-
ferent likelihood levels) are less likely to act upon their beliefs. Our measurement 
of beliefs, free from contamination by ambiguity attitudes, shows that traditional 
introspective trust survey measures capture trust in the commonly accepted sense of 
belief in trustworthiness of others. Further, trustworthy people also decide to trust 
more due to their beliefs that others are similar to themselves. This paper shows that 
applications of ambiguity theories to game theory can bring useful new empirical 
insights.
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1 Introduction
Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921) emphasized the importance of developing models 
for ambiguity (unknown probabilities). Ambiguity is ubiquitous in economic deci-
sions and in everyday life. Ellsberg (1961) showed that ambiguity models have to be 
fundamentally different from traditional risk (known probabilities) models. Despite 
the importance of ambiguity, only at the end of the 1980s people succeeded in devel-
oping the first decision models for ambiguity (Gilboa 1987; Gilboa and Schmeidler 
1989; Schmeidler 1989). Since then, many fields in economics started catching up 
with ambiguity, including game theory, the field considered in this paper.
In games, a major source of uncertainty concerns opponents’ strategy choices. 
Traditional game theory invariably assumed that all uncertainties could be expressed 
in terms of Bayesian probabilities (e.g., Crawford et  al. 2013). Yet, there is much 
evidence showing that the Bayesian principles are empirically violated and that 
people are usually ambiguity averse (Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2015). With the 
increased awareness of the importance of ambiguity in economics, many theoretical 
studies have applied ambiguity models to the analysis of games, producing more 
realistic predictions of people’s choices.1 However, experimental exploration is lag-
ging behind. For instance, many experimental studies measure subjective beliefs of 
players about strategy choices of others, but these studies commonly take beliefs to 
be Bayesian (ambiguity neutral) additive probabilities because no alternative tools 
were available yet.2 Even if one assumes that using such probabilities is rational,3 
then this assumption still does not hold empirically.
Some experimental studies did allow for non-neutral ambiguity attitudes and 
tested their effects on behavior in games.4 However, they did not measure ambiguity 
attitudes directly but rather varied the level of ambiguous information. Inferences 
from this approach are limited because ambiguity attitudes of subjects are hetero-
geneous. Furthermore, manipulating levels of ambiguity (e.g., by matching subjects 
with foreign vs. domestic opponents) produces confounds due to changes in beliefs 
about opponents’ strategy choices. Controlling for beliefs would have been required, 
but this could not be done properly without also accounting for ambiguity attitudes.
A difficulty that has hampered the application of ambiguity theories to natural 
events, including strategy choices of others, arises from the necessity to control for 
beliefs when measuring ambiguity. Until recently, it was not known how to do this 
1 Such studies include Angelopoulos and Koutsougeras (2015), Battigalli et al. (2015), Chakravarty and 
Kelsey (2016), De Marcoa and Romaniello (2015), Grant et  al. (2016), Kellner (2015), Kelsey and le 
Roux (2017), Eichberger and Kelsey (2011) and Stauber (2011), and, for updating, Perea (2014).
2 See, for instance, Armantier and Treich (2009), Blanco et  al. (2010), Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker 
(2008), Heinemann et al. (2009), Huck and Weizsäcker (2002), Nagel et al. (2018), Neri (2015), Nyarko 
and Schotter (2002), Palfrey and Wang (2009), Rutström and Wilcox (2009), Schlag et  al. (2015) and 
Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015, footnote 16).
3 This assumption deviates from the rationality judgments by Ellsberg (1961), Gilboa et al. (2010), and 
others.
4 Such studies include, besides some papers cited later, Di Mauro and Castro (2011), Eichberger et al. 
(2008) and Kelsey and le Roux (2017).
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for natural events. This is why ambiguity measurements have so far focused on arti-
ficial ambiguity through Ellsberg urns or experimenter-specified probability inter-
vals, where controlling for beliefs is possible using symmetries introduced by the 
experimental design. Such symmetries are rarely available for natural events, such 
as those about moves by others in strategic situations. Baillon et al. (2018b) resolved 
the aforementioned difficulty for individual choice. They introduced an ambiguity 
measurement method that works for all events without the need for artificial sym-
metries in beliefs. We show how Baillon et al.’s method can be applied to games. By 
relating ambiguity attitudes to behavior in games, we thus show, with the specific 
example of the trust game, how accounting for ambiguity can enrich our understand-
ing of decisions under strategic ambiguity.
2  Trust and ambiguity
Trust has received much interest in economics (Fehr 2009; Johnson and Mislin 
2011; Li 2007; Smith and Wilson 2017). In the commonly accepted sense, trust rep-
resents people’s belief in the trustworthiness of others (Gambetta 2000). In deciding 
to trust others, however, not only people’s beliefs but also their attitudes towards 
uncertainty matter because usually it is uncertain whether their trust will be recip-
rocated. Most previous studies focused on how people’s risk attitude impacts their 
trust decisions. No clear relation was found (Eckel and Wilson 2004; Houser et al. 
2010). However, we almost never know an objective probability of others being 
trustworthy, and the decision to trust is usually a decision under ambiguity. It has 
been well documented in the literature that people treat ambiguity differently than 
risk (Ellsberg 1961; Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2015). To properly understand 
people’s trust decisions, it is desirable to take their ambiguity attitudes into account. 
To illustrate, assume we observe two risk neutral persons. Person A decides not to 
trust whereas person B does. Then it is still possible that A is not less trusting than 
B, but only more ambiguity averse (see Case 3 in the Appendix). Hence, a control 
for ambiguity attitude is needed. This paper provides this control. We separate ambi-
guity attitudes from subjective beliefs and measure beliefs5 properly also if subjects 
are not ambiguity neutral.
We can now reveal how ambiguity affects trust decisions. Whereas risk atti-
tudes may be unrelated to trust decisions, ambiguity attitudes play a significant role. 
They contaminate trusting decisions as predicted by most current ambiguity theo-
ries: the decision to trust involves making oneself vulnerable to the trustworthiness 
of another, which is ambiguous. Hence, the more a person dislikes ambiguity, the 
less attractive she will find the trusting option. We thus empirically confirm, for the 
first time controlling all the aforementioned components, that, given same beliefs in 
trustworthiness of the other, people who are more ambiguity averse decide to trust 
less.
5 In this paper, beliefs refer to additive subjective probabilities as under ambiguity neutrality. All devia-
tions from ambiguity neutrality, also if cognitive, are referred to as ambiguity attitude here.
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Corcos et al. (2012) also argued that the trust game involves ambiguity, and found 
a positive relation between ambiguity aversion and trust decisions. They measured 
ambiguity aversion in the traditional way using artificial Ellsberg urns.6 However, 
ambiguity attitudes towards unknown urns can be different than towards the trust-
worthiness of others (Tversky and Fox 1995). We will measure ambiguity attitudes 
directly for trust game events, thus increasing validity. In this respect, our contribu-
tion is the analog for ambiguity of what Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), Evans and 
Krueger (2017) and Fairley et al. (2016) did for risk: they measured risk attitudes 
both for artificial events and for trust game events, and showed that risk attitudes 
provide better predictors in the latter case.
Apart from aversion, which is a motivational component describing how much 
a person dislikes ambiguity, ambiguity attitude is characterized by a second, cogni-
tive component called insensitivity. Insensitivity has been found to be an important 
predictor of behavior in experimental studies of individual choice (Trautmann and 
van de Kuilen 2015). It describes how much people perceive ambiguity in a given 
decision situation. The more they do, the more they treat all events alike, as one blur, 
resulting in lower discriminatory power towards different likelihood levels. As a 
result, insensitivity reduces a person’s tendency to act based on her beliefs. We show 
that insensitivity also plays a significant role in the trust decision. Although people 
with more optimistic beliefs about others’ trustworthiness decide to trust more, we 
find that people who have equally optimistic beliefs but are more insensitive decide 
to trust less often. On the other hand, for people with equally pessimistic beliefs 
about the other’s trustworthiness the more insensitive people decide to trust more 
often. Thus, we find that ambiguity about the opponent’s choice in a strategic game 
has a two-fold effect on behavior: it makes safe strategies more attractive to averse 
players, and it makes insensitive players less likely to act based on their beliefs.
Because our techniques allow us to properly measure beliefs, we can further con-
tribute new evidence to a number of open issues in the literature. In particular, we 
consider the relationship between behavioral and survey measures of trust. We can 
confirm that introspective survey questions on trust, such as the ones included in the 
well-known and widely used World Values Survey (WVS) and General Social Sur-
vey (GSS), do capture trust in the commonly accepted sense of belief in trustworthi-
ness of others. Some authors have suggested that people use their own trustworthi-
ness as a signal, and therefore thrustworthy people are more likely to trust others. 
We show that this is indeed due to their beliefs: they believe others to be similar to 
themselves. This self-similar reasoning in belief formation may also explain why 
some previous studies found survey measures of trust—which, as argued before, 
capture people’s beliefs about others—to be related to own trustworthiness (Glaeser 
et  al. 2000). Trustworthiness, as we show, serves as a signal for forming beliefs 
about others.
6 Corcos et al. (2012) used Chakravarty and Roy’s (2009) measure of ambiguity aversion. A difficulty is 
that this measure is contaminated by risk attitude, which does not cancel (Wakker 2018).
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3  Method
Figure 1 shows the trust game used in our study. A trustor faces a binary choice. 
If she chooses the distrust option, both she and her trustee receive €10 for sure 
and there is no uncertainty. Alternatively, she can choose the trust option, whose 
outcome is uncertain. Then the amount she receives depends on the trustee’s 
choice from three allocation options, where the first amount is the payment for 
the trustor and the second is for the trustee: R (Reciprocate) = (€15, €15), M 
(Middle) = (€10, €18), and S (selfish) = (€8, €22).
The game we used is a modification of the trust game of Bohnet and Zeck-
hauser (2004) and Bohnet et  al. (2008). The only difference is that the trustee 
has one extra option (M). Option M gives the trustee the possibility to be self-
ish without hurting the trustor but at a slight efficiency cost—the total payment 
is then €28 instead of €30. We added this extra option so that we could observe 
ambiguity-generated insensitivity (defined later), for which at least three events 
are needed (Baillon et al. 2018b).
Let Ei (i = r, m, or s) denote the event that the trustee chooses option I (I = R, 
M, or S). These events are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. We refer to them 
as single events. A composite event, denoted Eij (i ≠ j), is the union Ei ∪ Ej of two 
single events. For each event E (Ei or Eij) and for a fixed outcome X > 0 (X =  €15 
in the experiment), XE0 denotes a—possibly ambiguous—prospect that pays X 
if event E happens and 0 otherwise. Similarly, Xq0 denotes a risky prospect that 
pays X with probability q and 0 with probability 1 − q.
Definition 3.1 The matching probability m  (mi or  mij) of an event E  (Ei or  Eij) is 
the probability such that the decision maker is indifferent between prospects  XE0 
and  Xm0.
The matching probability m of an event E depends on the decision maker’s 
subjective belief in event E, but also on her ambiguity attitude. Dimmock et al. 
(2016, Theorem 3.1) showed that, if we know beliefs, then matching probabili-
ties capture people’s ambiguity attitudes while controlling for their risk atti-
tudes. Baillon et  al. (2018b) added the control for unknown beliefs. We next 
briefly introduce the two indexes of Baillon et  al. (2018b) that we use. Let 
ms = (mr + mm + ms)∕3 denote the average single-event matching probability 
Trustor 
TrusteeTrust Distrust 
(€10, €10) 
 (Reciprocate) 
(€15, €15) 
 (Middle) 
(€10, €18) 
 (Selfish) 
(€8, €22) 
Fig. 1  Trust game
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and let mc = (mrm + mrs + mms)∕3 denote the average composite-event matching 
probability.
Definition 3.2 The ambiguity aversion index is 
Definition 3.3 The a(mbiguity-generated)-insensitivity index is
Under ambiguity neutrality, ms = 13 and mc =
2
3
, so that both indexes are 0. The 
indexes have been normalized to have value 1 as maximum (under a regularity assump-
tion). Note how we could calibrate ambiguity neutrality without knowing beliefs. This 
is key to this method. For an ambiguity averse person, the matching probabilities are 
low and accordingly the aversion index is high. She is willing to pay a premium (in 
winning probability) to avoid ambiguity. A maximally ambiguity averse person has all 
matching probabilities 0 and the aversion index is 1. For ambiguity seeking subjects, 
the aversion index is negative.
The insensitivity index concerns the (lack of) discriminatory power of the decision 
maker regarding different levels of likelihood. For a completely insensitive person who 
does not distinguish between composite and single events (mc = ms), the insensitivity 
index takes its maximal value 1. This happens for people who take all uncertainties as 
fifty–fifty. The better a person discriminates between composite and single events, the 
larger mc − ms is and the smaller the insensitivity index is. The index thus captures 
cognitive discriminatory power, and also perception of ambiguity. The more ambiguity 
a person perceives, the more the likelihoods of the events are perceived as one blur and 
the higher the index is.
Several indexes of ambiguity attitude have been proposed in the literature under 
particular theoretical assumptions. The beginning of §6 explains that our indexes 
agree with most of those on their domain of definition. Further, they generalize those 
domains. In this way, our indexes unify and extend many existing indexes.
Our elicitation method allows for extrapolating a-neutral probabilities pi. These can 
be interpreted as the beliefs of an ambiguity neutral twin of the decision maker, who 
is exactly the same as the decision maker except that she is ambiguity neutral. That is, 
a-neutral probabilities are additive subjective probabilities that result after correcting 
for ambiguity attitudes. Online Appendix C shows that, under certain assumptions:
The Appendix provides numerical examples to illustrate that ambiguity attitudes 
can confound measurements of social preferences, and that it is desirable to correct 
for it.
(3.1)b = 1 − ms − mc.
(3.2)a = 3 ×
(
1
3
−
(
mc − ms
))
.
(3.3)pi =
3
(
mc − ms
)
+ 3mi − 3mjk + 2(1 − a)
6(1 − a)
, where {i, j, k} = {r,m, s}.
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We summarize our predictions:
1. Matching probabilities are not Bayesian, and violate additivity; i.e., they are not 
ambiguity neutral. Instead, subjects are (1a) ambiguity averse and (1b) a-insen-
sitive.
2. Ambiguity attitudes confound effects of social preferences. (2a) more ambiguity 
averse people decide to trust less often; (2b) a-insensitivity makes people less 
likely to act upon their beliefs, dampening the effect of prediction 3 below.
3. People with more optimistic beliefs in others’ trustworthiness decide to trust more 
often.
4  Experimental design
4.1  Subjects
In total, 182 subjects (56% male) were recruited from the subject pool of the experi-
mental laboratory at Erasmus School of Economics.
4.2  Incentives
The experiment was computer-based7 and consisted of seven sessions. It was incen-
tivized using a modification of the prior incentive system (Prince; Johnson et  al. 
2015), avoiding income effects (Blanco et al. 2010). At the beginning of each ses-
sion (with n subjects), one volunteer was invited to randomly select n/2 pairs of 
sealed envelopes. The experimenter then unpaired the envelopes in the selected pile 
(by removing the clips holding each pair together). Next each subject would draw 
one envelope from the pile.
It was explained to each subject that, throughout the experiment, she would be 
paired with a partner whose subject ID was inside the envelope. During the experi-
ment, she would face different decision situations, where her payments depended on 
both her own and her partner’s decisions. One of these decision situations was inside 
the envelope, and this was the only one that mattered for the real payment at the end. 
Each subject earned €5 participation fee, plus the earnings from the decision situa-
tion inside her envelope. Including the participation fee, an average subject earned 
€14.87 in our experiment.
7 The online appendix presents the structure and instructions of the experiment. The full experiment is 
available online at http://www.peter wakke r.com/trust new/begin .php. For testing, please use any 4-digit 
number starting with the digit 6 (e.g., 6067) as a subject ID.
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4.3  Stimuli
During the experiment, subjects were confronted with three types of decision situa-
tions. They were also asked to answer some demographic and introspective survey 
questions, which were not incentivized. Each subject first faced the trustor decision 
of the trust game (Fig.  2). It was explained to her that her own and her partner’s 
choice as a trustee would determine their final payment if this decision situation was 
in her envelope.
After making their choices as the trustor, subjects proceeded to the second part 
of the experiment, where they faced 24 decision situations designed to elicit their 
matching probabilities. Figure 3 depicts a typical decision situation of this type. A 
subject chose between two options, both of which could pay her €15 but under dif-
ferent conditions. Option 1 was an ambiguous prospect paying €15 if her partner (as 
the trustee) chose option R in the trust game. Option 2 was a risky prospect paying 
€15 with a 50% chance.
An example with an explanation of the typical decision situation was presented 
to the subjects before they made their decisions. To check whether they understood 
the procedure, subjects had to answer four questions correctly before they could 
The following may be inside your envelope. 
Fig. 2  Trust game: trustor decision situation
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proceed.8 They could also click on a reminder button to view the description of the 
trust game again.
Matching probabilities were elicited for all single events 
{
Er,Em,Es
}
 and com-
posite events 
{
Erm,Ems,Ers
}
. For each single or composite event, bisection was used 
to elicit its matching probability. For instance, for event Er the subject first faced the 
decision situation in Fig. 3. If she chose option 1, the winning probability in option 
2 increased in the next decision situation; otherwise, it decreased. For each event, 
subjects faced four decision situations, where option 1 stayed fixed and the winning 
probability in option 2 varied depending on the choices in the previous situation.9 
Figure 4 shows how the probabilities for later decision situations and ultimately the 
event’s matching probability were determined by subjects’ choices. We will refer to 
the four decision situations for each event as a block. The 24 decision situations for 
eliciting matching probabilities thus constituted six blocks. The blocks appeared in 
random order. After each block, a demographic question was asked to refresh sub-
jects’ thinking mode. The demographic questions also appeared in random order.
In the third part of the experiment subjects made a decision as the trustee in the 
same trust game as before. Figure 5 shows the trustee decision situation.
Subjects also answered non-incentivized introspective questions about their 
general trust attitudes. The three questions, which are identical to the general trust 
questions used in the VWS and the GSS, were: “Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with peo-
ple?”; “Would you say that most of the time, people try to be helpful, or that they are 
mostly just looking out for themselves?”; and “Do you think that most people would 
try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair?”. 
Fig. 3  A typical ambiguity decision situation
9 The advantage of using Prince (Johnson et  al. 2015) to implement the bisection procedure is that it 
enhances incentive compatibility. Under Prince, the decision situation that eventually matters is pre-
determined and does not depend on subjects’ choices during the experiment, excluding the possibility 
to answer strategically so as to manipulate later stimuli. It is, therefore, always in the best interest of 
subjects to reveal their true preferences, and this is simple and transparent to subjects. When measuring 
beliefs in game situations, it is especially desirable to ensure that the belief measurements do not distort 
the game (Heinemann et al. 2009, pp. 189–190).
8 Online appendix OB provides information on the frequency of subjects failing these comprehension 
questions. Robustness tests in the appendix show that removing subjects who failed the test more than 
three times did not affect the findings of this paper.
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95
92
+6 89
86
-6 83
+12 80
77
74
71
-12 68
+6 65
+24 62
-6 59
56
53
50
47
44
+6 41
-24 38
-6 35
+12 32
29
26
23
-12 20
+6 17
14
-6 11
8
5
Winning Probabilities in Option 2 Matching
Probabilities
Fig. 4  Determination of probabilities in the bisection method. Notes For each event, the winning prob-
ability of the first decision situation is always 50%. At each node, if the subject chooses option 1 (2), the 
probability on the upper (lower) branch is used as the winning probability in option 2 in the next decision 
situation, while option 1 remains the same. The last column is the matching probability recorded depend-
ing on subjects’ choices in the previous four decision situations
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In each question, subjects could either agree or disagree with the statement. The 
answer indicating the trust decision was coded as 1 for each question, and the other 
answer as 0. The general trust measure was then taken as the average of the three 
responses.
4.4  Payment
After all subjects had completed the experiment, they were called to the payment 
desk one by one. Each subject opened her envelope. If it was the trust game decision 
situation (either as the trustor or the trustee), her decision and her partner’s choice 
determined her final payment. If the envelope contained a matching probability deci-
sion situation that she had encountered during the experiment, her partner’s trustee 
decision determined her final payment if she had chosen the ambiguous option 1. 
Otherwise, the winning probability of option 2 decided her payment.10 The same 
matching probability decision situation was in her partner’s envelope, so that her 
trustee decision determined her partner’s final payment if her partner had chosen the 
ambiguous option 1. It could also happen that the subject had not encountered the 
matching probability decision situation that was in her envelope. We then inferred 
the subject’s choice in the new situation from her choice in a similar situation by 
dominance. For instance, suppose the subject had chosen option 1 in the decision 
situation in Fig. 3, but a decision situation with a winning probability of 26% was 
in her envelope. Because of the bisection procedure, she could not have encountered 
Fig. 5  Trust game: trustee decision situation
10 If, for instance, the winning probability of option 2 was 50%, then the subject threw two 10-sided 
dice, and any number below 50 (which had 50% chance of occurring) meant that the subject would be 
paid the prize.
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this situation during the experiment. We would then explain to the subject that, since 
she preferred the ambiguous option 1 to an even better option 2 (with 50% winning 
chance), we inferred that she would also prefer option 1 in the decision situation 
where option 2 gives 26% winning chance. We would then implement option 1.
5  Results
5.1  Description of data
Of the 182 participants, we removed 20 (11.0%) who failed monotonicity checks11 
at least twice. Table 1 shows summary statistics. 54% of trustors chose to trust their 
trustees. Of the trustees, 22% reciprocated the trust by choosing option R, 25% chose 
the middle option M, and 53% chose the selfish option S. There was substantial 
heterogeneity in the trustors’ ambiguity attitudes and beliefs. The median trustor 
was ambiguity indifferent (b = 0;   contrary to prediction 1a), a-insensitive (predic-
tion 1b), and believed that the trustee was equally likely to choose any of the three 
options. In addition to these variables elicited from subjects’ choices, Table 1 also 
Table 1  Summary statistics
Trustor = 1 if the trustor chooses the trusting option 1 and 0 otherwise; trustee = 1, 2, and 3 if trustee 
chooses option R, M, and S respectively; ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity are the index values of 
ambiguity attitudes; pr, pm, and ps are the a-neutral probabilities for the three events; general trust is the 
mean score in the WVS/GSS questions; gender = 1 if the subject is male; weekly drinks is the weekly 
number of alcoholic beverages consumed; nationality = 1 if the subject is Dutch and 0 if not; happiness 
is the subjective answer to the question “Do you feel happy in general?”, which can take values from 0 to 
10; siblings is the number of siblings
Mean Median SD Min Max Interquartile range
Trustor 0.54 1 0.5 0 1 [0, 1]
Trustee 2.31 3 0.8 1 3 [2, 3]
Ambiguity aversion − 0.01 0 0.17 − 0.78 0.58 [− 0.08, 0.06]
A-insensitivity 0.23 0.16 0.25 − 0.32 1 [0.1, 0.34]
pr 0.31 0.32 0.21 0 1 [0.17, 0.38]
pm 0.30 0.33 0.16 0 0.96 [0.21, 0.37]
ps 0.41 0.33 0.24 0 1 [0.27, 0.56]
General trust 0.47 0.33 0.35 0 1 [0.33, 0.67]
Gender (male = 1) 0.56 1 0.5 0 1 [0, 1]
Weekly drinks 4.18 2 5.15 0 30 [1, 5]
Nationality (Dutch = 1) 0.56 1 0.5 0 1 [0, 1]
Happiness 7.01 7 1.67 0 10 [6, 8]
Siblings 1.48 1 1.18 0 8 [1, 2]
11 For each subject, we performed six monotonicity tests. By monotonicity, subjects’ matching prob-
abilities for a composite event should not be lower than those of the single events included in the com-
position. Therefore, two tests were performed for each composite event, resulting in six tests in total per 
subject. On average, the fail rate of these monotonicity checks was 7.5%.
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describes subjects’ responses to the introspective survey questions about general 
trust, gender, drinking habits, nationality, subjective well-being (happiness), and 
number of siblings.
We did not find any gender effects and therefore do not report statistics on them. 
Unsurprisingly, trustees’ decisions were not related to their ambiguity aversion 
(휌 = 0.3, p = 0.75) nor to their a-insensitivity (휌 = 0.08, p = 0.40). We now turn to 
trustors.
5.2  Ambiguity attitudes and beliefs as determinants of trust decisions
Table  2 presents binary logistic regressions of our subjects’ decisions to trust on 
their ambiguity attitudes and beliefs. Model 1 includes as explanatory variables 
the two indexes (aversion and insensitivity) describing subjects’ ambiguity atti-
tudes. Model 2 includes a variable that measures subjects’ beliefs about their trus-
tees’ trustworthiness, (pr − ps), with higher values corresponding to more optimistic 
beliefs. Model 3 combines Models 1 and 2. Model 4 adds an interaction between 
beliefs and a-insensitivity, and Model 5 adds demographic controls.
Because the decision to trust involves choosing an ambiguous prospect over a 
certain prospect, the more ambiguity averse a trustor is, the less attractive she is 
expected to find the trusting option. More ambiguity averse subjects indeed decided 
to trust less often (prediction 2a). Subjects’ beliefs also mattered for their decisions 
to trust. Subjects who were more optimistic about their trustees’ trustworthiness 
Table 2  Regression: what contributes to the decision to trust?
162 subjects remained after removing those who failed monotonicity checks at least twice. Model 2–5 
have 161 observations because one subject’s matching probabilities for all events were the same so that 
her a-neutral probabilities were not identifiable
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Dependent variable
Trustor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ambiguity aversion − 2.09** − 2.39** − 2.56** − 2.56**
(1.04) (1.18) (1.17) (1.27)
A-insensitivity 0.51 0.72 − 0.07 − 0.34
(0.68) (0.74) (0.79) (0.86)
pr − ps 1.96*** 2.10*** 3.81*** 3.90***
(0.46) (0.49) (0.92) (0.95)
A-insensitivity * (pr − ps) − 5.96*** − 6.34***
(2.25) (2.40)
Demographic controls No No No No Yes
Observations 162 161 161 161 161
Log Likelihood − 109.19 − 100.21 − 97.60 − 93.79 − 90.40
Akaike Inf. Crit. 224.38 204.42 203.19 197.57 200.80
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were more likely to decide to trust (prediction 3). However, this positive effect of 
optimistic beliefs on trusting behavior was dampened by subjects’ a-insensitivity—
the second component of ambiguity attitude (prediction 2b). Subjects who were 
more insensitive distinguished less between different levels of likelihoods, so that 
their decisions were less impacted by those differences and their acts were less based 
on their beliefs. The negative interaction effect between insensitivity and beliefs (in 
Models 4 and 5) confirms this prediction.
Average marginal effects computed from the regression results in Table 2 indi-
cate that the aforementioned effects were also behaviorally significant. For instance, 
estimates of Model 5 show that one standard deviation increase in ambiguity aver-
sion was associated with a decrease of 8 percentage points in the subject’s predicted 
probability of deciding to trust. As beliefs became more optimistic by one stand-
ard deviation increase in pr − ps, the probability that a subject with a-insensitivity 
index value 0 decided to trust increased by 26 percentage points. But for subjects 
with a-insensitivity index values of, say 0.16 and 0.34, corresponding to the 0.5 and 
0.75 quantiles, respectively, the same improvement in beliefs led to lower increases 
in the probability of deciding to trust: 22 and 15 percentage point increases, 
respectively.
5.3  What do introspective survey questions measure?
In the literature on trust, an oft addressed and still unresolved issue concerns the 
validity of attitudinal survey questions on trust. For instance, experiments by Ashraf 
et  al. (2006), Glaeser et  al. (2000) and Lazzarini et  al. (2005) found that, instead 
of measuring people’s trust in others, attitudinal survey questions captured peo-
ple’s own trustworthiness. Fehr et  al. (2002), however, found that trustworthiness 
was unrelated to attitudinal trust, and that trusting behavior did in fact correlate with 
some of the survey questions on trust. In Sapienza et al. (2013), attitudinal trust was 
related to both trust and trustworthiness behaviors. These authors argued that trust 
decisions are affected by other-regarding preferences and risk aversion—preference 
components other than people’s belief in the trustworthiness of others—whereas 
survey questions may mainly capture the belief component. (Fehr et al. 2002 also 
suggested that attitudinal trust may relate to trust behavior through the belief 
component.)
Our main findings have shown that ambiguity present in the trust game also 
affects trusting behavior through the trustor’s motivational (aversion) and cogni-
tive (or perceptual) attitudes toward ambiguity. We have thus shown an additional 
preference-based component affecting trusting behavior. We later show that people’s 
trust survey responses are positively correlated with their beliefs. Thus, we provide 
evidence confirming that survey questions on trust measure trust in the commonly 
accepted sense of belief in others’ trustworthiness. For example, this was expressed 
by Gambetta (2000): “When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustwor-
thy, we implicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is 
beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging 
in some form of cooperation with him.”
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In Table  3 we examine the relationship between our subjects’ responses to the 
introspective survey questions about general trust and their trusting and trustworthi-
ness behaviors. For all models, we use linear regressions with the dependent vari-
able being the mean score of subjects’ responses to the three WVS and GSS ques-
tions about general trust. Model 1 examines the extent to which trusting behavior 
in the two-person game is related to the survey measure of trust. Model 2 looks at 
subjects’ trustworthiness behavior rather than at their trusting behavior. In Model 3 
we include subjects’ ambiguity attitudes and beliefs, which were found to determine 
trusting behavior, as explanatory variables. Model 4 adds our demographic controls 
to Model 3.
Subjects’ responses to the survey questions were positively correlated with their 
decisions to trust, but had no relation with their decisions as the trustee (trustwor-
thiness behavior).12 These findings are reflective of the mixed results obtained in 
previous studies. Models 3 and 4 offer an insight. In our sample, subjects with more 
optimistic beliefs about their trustees’ trustworthiness scored higher in the survey 
measure of trust, whereas their ambiguity attitudes were unrelated to the scores in 
the survey measure. These results show that the survey questions about general trust 
do capture people’s beliefs. They also suggest an added reason for why the survey 
Table 3  Regression: What is the 
general trust survey measuring?
In Table 3, the number of observations in all models is 1 less than 
for the models in Table  2, because one subject’s survey responses 
were missing. The number of observations for Model 2 is lower 
because 36 subjects in the first two sessions of the experiment did 
not make the trustee decision
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Dependent variable
General trust
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trustor 0.11**
(0.06)
Trustee − 0.05
(0.04)
Ambiguity aversion − 0.27 − 0.20
(0.17) (0.17)
A-insensitivity 0.05 0.09
(0.12) (0.12)
pr − ps 0.15** 0.13**
(0.07) (0.06)
Demographic controls No No No Yes
Observations 161 125 160 160
R2 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.10
12 The same holds if we include the trustee decisions as separate dummy variables in the regression.
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measure of trust may not robustly relate to trusting behavior in the trust game: trust-
ing behavior is affected by people’s beliefs and ambiguity attitudes, whereas the sur-
vey measure captures beliefs alone and is not distorted by ambiguity attitudes.
The finding that survey questions on trust can capture people’s beliefs in the trust-
worthiness of others also offers an explanation for why some studies (e.g., Glaeser 
et al. 2000) found a correlation between people’s own trustworthiness behavior and 
their answers to survey questions on trust in others. People often form their beliefs 
about others based on their own types (Ross et  al. 1977; Rubinstein and Salant 
2016). They expect others to be similar to themselves. Consistent with this self-sim-
ilar reasoning in belief formation, Fig. 6 shows that subjects’ beliefs in the trustwor-
thiness of others is strongly correlated with their own trustworthiness. Subjects who 
chose the reciprocating option R in the role of a trustee also believed their trustees 
to be most likely to choose option R (p value < 0.01; Jonckenheere test). Those who 
chose the selfish option S similarly believed their trustees to be most likely to do the 
same (p-value < 0.01; Jonckenheere test), but this was not so for option M.
If survey questions capture beliefs about others’ trustworthiness and if beliefs 
about others are based on own trustworthiness, then it is plausible to expect a cor-
relation between the survey measure and people’s own trustworthiness. However, as 
shown in Table 3 (Model 2) there was no significant relationship between trustwor-
thiness and the survey measure of trust in our sample.
Finally, we note that the self-similar reasoning in belief formation provides 
insight into previous findings on earnings in trust games, namely, that trusting peo-
ple lost money on average (Berg et al. 1995; Ashraf et al. 2006). In our sample, the 
actual frequencies of trustee decisions (21, 27, and 52% choosing option R, M, and 
S, respectively) were closest to the median beliefs of the most prevalent type: the 
selfish trustees who chose option S. The self-similar reasoning in belief formation 
would predict this. Applying the same reasoning, the other two types ended up being 
Fig. 6  Belief about partner by own trustworthiness. Notes Each panel in Fig.  6 presents the median 
a-neutral probabilities of an event (R, M, or S) split by subjects’ own trustee decisions. The dashed hori-
zontal line indicates the actual frequency
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overly optimistic about others’ trustworthiness. Because trusting behavior is driven 
by (overly) optimistic beliefs, trusting subjects lost money on average.
6  Discussion and related literature
We used the indexes of Baillon et al. (2018b) for ambiguity attitude measurements. 
We briefly discuss features and validity of these indexes here. See Baillon et  al. 
(2018a) for more details. Indexes can never completely capture complex phenom-
ena, and cannot be valid for all theories. For instance, the popular relative risk aver-
sion index −aU��(a)∕U�(a) varies with wealth under constant absolute risk aversion, 
and with probability under prospect theory (Wakker 2008). Baillon et  al. (2018a) 
explain that their ambiguity indexes are valid under all “uni-separable” ambiguity 
theories. This includes Ghirardato and Marinacci’s (2001) biseparable utility and, 
thus, Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) maxmin expected utility, Gilboa’s (1987) and 
Schmeidler’s (1989) Choquet expected utility, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) 
prospect theory for gains (as in our case), and α-maxmin utility (Ghirardato et al. 
2004; Luce and Raiffa 1957, Sect. 13.5). Non-biseparable theories include Einhorn 
and Hogarth (1985). Baillon et  al.’s indexes agree with, and thus unify and gen-
eralize (e.g., by not assuming expected utility for risk) many indexes proposed in 
papers before, including those of Dow and Werlang (1992) and Schmeidler (1989) 
for Choquet expected utility, Abdellaoui et al. (2011) and Dimmock et al. (2016) for 
prospect theory, Ghirardato et al. (2004) and Luce and Raiffa (1957, Sect. 13.5) for 
α-maxmin expected utility, and Dimmock et al. (2015) and Epstein and Schneider 
(2010) for ε-contamination multiple priors. Baillon et al. (2018a) also showed that, 
whereas the aversion index could be estimated from two matching probabilities, we 
need six for the insensitivity index.
The aforementioned theories have in common that ambiguity attitudes are mod-
eled through event dependence; i.e., functions operating on events. The utility 
function of outcomes is assumed invariant across different contexts. This assump-
tion underlies the use of matching probabilities.13 Another kind of ambiguity theo-
ries capture ambiguity attitudes through functions on outcomes, Klibanoff et  al.’s 
(2005) smooth model being the most popular one. Under these theories, our indexes 
become outcome dependent, in the same way as the relative index of risk aversion 
can be wealth or probability dependent. Outcome dependence is, indeed, charac-
teristic of such theories. It also holds for more general theories including Gul and 
Pesendorfer (2015) and Maccheroni et al. (2006).
A convenient feature of matching probabilities, and the indexes derived from 
them, is that they capture ambiguity attitudes irrespective of risk attitudes (Dim-
mock et  al. 2016, Theorem  3.1). The intuitive explanation is that risk attitude 
plays the same role for the two prospects in Definition 3.1 and, hence, drops from 
the equations. The remarkable implication is that measuring ambiguity attitudes 
is easier than measuring risk attitudes.
13 For specialists: this is implied by Savage’s (1954) P4 axiom.
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Many theoretical studies, and some empirical studies (see introduction), 
recently incorporated ambiguity into game theory. We are aware of two studies 
that measured aversion towards strategic ambiguity (Camerer and Karjalainen 
1994; Ivanov 2011). However, these studies did not use ambiguity attitudes to 
predict strategic behavior, but, conversely, devised special games with the pur-
pose of deriving ambiguity attitudes from strategic behavior. They did not derive 
beliefs from revealed preferences, but Ivanov (2011) controled for beliefs by 
deriving them from introspection. Both studies only considered ambiguity aver-
sion, and not insensitivity. Our measurements of ambiguity attitudes, carried 
out in trust games, can be used in all game situations, are independent from the 
actual behavior in the games so that they can be used to predict game behavior, 
are entirely revealed preference based, and also consider insensitivity. It is not 
surprising that prediction 1a (ambiguity averson) was not confirmed. Many recent 
studies found that ambiguity aversion is less prevalent than thought a decade ago; 
see Kocher et al. (2018) and their references.
Most studies on decisions to trust have so far focused on relations with risk 
attitudes. Fehr (2009) reviewed the existing literature and argued that trust deci-
sions are not just a special case of decision under risk. In decisions under social 
uncertainty, like the betrayal uncertainty faced in the trust decision, other com-
ponents of preferences play important roles. Our study supports this claim. Even 
if risk attitudes of trustors play no role in their decisions to trust (Ashraf et  al. 
2006; Eckel and Wilson 2004; Houser et  al. 2010), ambiguity attitudes matter. 
Our measures of ambiguity attitude describe attitudes of our subjects specifically 
toward the betrayal ambiguity that they face in the trust game. We have shown 
that aversion to this ambiguity reduces people’s tendency to trust others. In addi-
tion, the ambiguity-generated likelihood insensitivity dampens the tendency of 
people to act on their beliefs about the trustworthiness of others. Clots-Figueras 
et  al. (2016) and Evans and Krueger (2017) considered effects of information 
provision on trust games, both in the form of objective risks and in the form of 
ambiguous risks. The former study found no significant differences, but the latter 
found more effect from objective than from ambiguous information, suggesting 
that the latter information is less valuable and changes less relative to the real 
situation.
Our methodology allows for separating preference-based ambiguity attitudes 
from the belief component. This opens up the possibility to examine whether differ-
ences in attitudes or beliefs drive observed trust differences, e.g., concerning social 
groups and culture. Social groups (Etang et al. 2011; Ferschtman and Gneezy 2001) 
and culture (Doney et al. 1998; Bornhorst et al. 2010) have been argued to drive a 
wedge in trust. Another question concerns whether such differences are driven pri-
marily by differences in preferences or in beliefs.
Belief measurements have been widely used in experimental economics, but 
invariably under the empirically invalid assumption of ambiguity neutrality. Ambi-
guity attitudes have therefore confounded such belief measurements so far. Using 
our techniques, we substantiated a number of hypotheses on trust and trustwor-
thiness with evidence from revealed preference data and proper measurements of 
beliefs.
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Our finding that optimistic beliefs about others’ trustworthiness (after correcting 
for ambiguity attitudes) increase trust decisions is similar to the findings of Ashraf 
et al. (2006) and Sapienza et al. (2013). They used a variation of Berg et al. (1995) 
investment game, in which trustors could choose which part of their endowment to 
send to their trustee. The amount sent to the trustee would then be tripled, and the 
trustee decided how much of the amount received to send back to the trustor. To 
elicit subjects’ beliefs about their trustees’ trustworthiness, they asked subjects to 
estimate the amount their trustee would return. They found a positive correlation 
between subjects’ estimations of the amount returned and the amount that subjects 
sent.
Our measure of belief is directly expressed in terms of probabilities rather than 
indirectly through a point estimate of a money amount, and is directly derived from 
revealed preferences with incentivization. Sapienza et al. (2013) rewarded accurate 
estimates of average amounts that would be sent back by trustees, but their imple-
mentation was not fully incentive compatible. First, because minimal distances 
between the estimates and the actual amounts sent were rewarded, subjects did not 
have the incentive to truthfully reveal extreme expectations. Second, because sub-
jects were rewarded for accurate estimates for each possible amount sent and sent 
back, hedging through strategic (and not truthful) guesses was possible.
Using our belief measurements, we also provided evidence confirming that intro-
spective survey questions on trust are good measures of trust in the sense of belief 
in others’ trustworthiness. Whereas decisions in the trust game are affected by both 
beliefs and ambiguity attitudes, trust survey responses are only positively correlated 
with beliefs, and not with ambiguity attitudes. This provides an additional explana-
tion for why survey and behavioral measures of trust may not be robustly related to 
each other. Moreover, we confirm that people’s beliefs about others are positively 
correlated with their own trustworthiness.
In the psychology literature, false consensus has been found, which describes 
people’s tendency to expect others to be close to themselves in characteristics, pref-
erences, and so on (Ross et  al. 1977). For instance, people who are happy them-
selves expect a larger proportion of the population to be happy than unhappy people 
do. Although the name of this phenomenon suggests that it is a bias, later studies 
showed that it could be the result of rational Bayesian updating using one’s own type 
as a signal (Dawes 1990; Prelec 2004). Similar to Rubinstein and Salant (2016), we 
find support for the self-similar reasoning in our game theoretical setting: people’s 
belief about others’ trustworthiness is correlated with their own trustworthiness. 
This result may explain why several studies found that survey measures of trust were 
correlated with people’s own trustworthiness. Combined with our finding that sur-
vey measures do capture beliefs in others’ trustworthiness, the self-similar reason-
ing in belief formation predicts that people’s own trustworthiness is correlated with 
their beliefs about others.
Interestingly, the aforementioned result indicates that prevalence of own type may 
determine the accuracy of beliefs about others in strategic interactions and, hence, it 
may also determine the earning of players acting on those beliefs. In our sample, the 
beliefs of the most prevalent type—the non-trustworthy one—are indeed closest to 
the actual distribution of trustworthiness. Previous findings that, on average, trusting 
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people lost money (Berg et al. 1995; Ashraf et al. 2006) may be explained by the 
trustworthy types not being prevalent in the samples considered.
7  Conclusion
Most studies on decisions to trust have so far focused on relations with risk attitudes 
(usually finding none) because ambiguity attitudes, while relevant, could not be meas-
ured there. We could measure them, by applying Baillon et al.’s (2018b) new method 
to games. Thus, we could analyze—and correct for—ambiguity attitudes. In particu-
lar, we could correct belief measurements (e.g., about another person being trustwor-
thy) this way. Belief measurements have been widely used in experimental economics, 
but invariably under the empirically invalid assumption of ambiguity neutrality. These 
belief measurements have so far been confounded by ambiguity attitudes.
We used our method to investigate the role of ambiguity in trust games. We 
found that the motivational ambiguity aversion reduces people’s trusting behavior. 
The cognitive likelihood insensitivity, not studied before in game theory, dampens 
the effect of people’s beliefs about others’ trustworthiness on their trust decisions. 
By analyzing and correcting belief measurements for ambiguity attitudes, we could 
shed new light on some unsettled issues in the literature. Thus, based on revealed 
preference data, we showed that survey trust questions do capture people’s beliefs 
about others’ trustworthiness. Moreover, people’s beliefs about others are posi-
tively correlated with their own trustworthiness. Hence, own type serves as a signal 
about others, explaining why trustworthy people lose excessively if most others are 
untrustworthy. This paper has shown how to reckon with ambiguity attitudes when 
studying human behavior in strategic situations, and the desirability to do so.
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tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix: Numerical illustration
This appendix illustrates numerically how ignoring ambiguity attitudes can lead to 
wrong conclusions about social preferences in the trust game. To focus on ambiguity 
and simplify the analysis, we assume that both players maximize expected utility for 
risk. Many social preference models have been used to analyze the trust game and 
to justify non-selfish choices by the trustee (Cox et al. 2007; Galizzi and Navarro-
Martínez 2017; Smith and Wilson 2017). Because of its simplicity, we use Fehr and 
Schmidt’s (1999) inequity aversion model. The trustee is affected by inequality aver-
sion, so that she may, for instance, prefer (15, 15) to (10, 18). She is also affected by 
guilt, inducing an extra dislike of outcomes for the trustor below 10 that cause the 
trustor to suffer from having trusted. Depending on the strength of these effects, she 
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may prefer either of R, M, or S, and the trustor is uncertain about this.14 We focus on 
the trustor’s decision in what follows. We assume that the trustor likes to gamble as 
much on R, M, and S, so that these events have the same matching probability. If the 
trustor is ambiguity neutral, maximizing expected utility, then the subjective prob-
abilities of these events are 1/3, and so are their matching probabilities and decision 
weights. Her utility function is
with a her aversion to being richer and b her aversion to being poorer.15 In this 
game, a is irrelevant because the trustor is always poorer. We assume a = 0. We first 
present four cases and then discuss them.
Case 1 [no aversion to inequality and ambiguity neutrality]. The trustor is ambi-
guity neutral and b = 0. Trust has utility 1
3
× 15 +
1
3
× 10 +
1
3
× 8 = 11 > 10. Trust 
is chosen.
Case 2 [aversion to inequality and ambiguity neutrality]. The trustor is ambigu-
ity neutral and b = 0.15. Trust has utility 1
3
× 15 +
1
3
× 8.8 +
1
3
× 5.9 = 9.9 < 10. 
Distrust is chosen.
Case 3 [no aversion to inequality and ambiguity aversion]. Here b = 0. But, 
because no known objective probabilities have been provided, the trustor perceives 
ambiguity. She is averse to ambiguity, and, relative to Case 1, pays extra attention 
to deviations in unfavorable directions. She therefore assigns extra weight 0.50 to 
the unfavorable S, and only weight 0.50 to the expected utility of Case 1.16 The 
utility of the trust decision is 0.50 × 8 + 0.50 × 11 = 9.50 < 10. Distrust is chosen.
U(x, y) = x − a ×max{x − y, 0} − b ×max{y − x, 0}
14 Fehr-Schmidt utility functions characterizing the trustee’s type can be as follows. The trustee’s indi-
vidual utility u is defined by u(x) = x for all x ≥ 10 and u(8) = 2 , four times overweighting the loss 2 
from 10 (guilt). The overall utility function U of the trustee, incorporating inequality aversion, is
Here b reflects the inequality aversion resulting from being poorer (“behind”), playing no role in our 
analysis, and a reflects the inequality aversion resulting from being richer (“ahead”). For a > 3∕8 the 
trustee chooses R = (15, 15) , for 3∕8 > a > 1∕3 the trustee chooses M = (10, 18) , and for 1∕3 > a the 
trustee chooses S = (8, 22) . Between indifferent options, random choice is assumed. The trustor is uncer-
tain about the type ( a ) of the trustee and, hence, about the trustee’s choice.
U(x, y) = u(y) − a ×max{u(y) − u(x), 0} − b ×max{u(x) − u(y), 0}.
15 We assume that the trustor, unlike the trustee, does not perceive any guilt in outcome 8.
16 We will not take the space to define several ambiguity theories, but briefly indicate how the weights 
can result from theories defined in the papers cited. The weights result from Gilboa and Schmeidler’s 
(1989) maxmin expected utility if, for instance, the set of priors is the following set of probability vec-
tors: 
{
휆1(1, 0, 0) + 휆2(0, 1, 0) + 휆3(0, 0, 1) + 휆4
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
∶ 휆j ≥ 0∀j;휆4 = 1 − 휆1 − 휆2 − 휆3 ≥
1
2
}
 , where 
the maxmin expected utility results from 휆3 = 12 = 휆4 . This is the special case of α-maxmin expected utility (Luce and Raiffa 1957, §13.5) with α = 0. The weights result from Abdellaoui et  al.’s (2011) 
source method—which is a special case of Gilboa’s (1987) and Schmeidler’s (1989) Choquet expected 
utility and of Tversky and Kahnneman’s (1992) prospect theory—if, for instance, the a-neutral probabil-
ity vector is 
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
 and wT (p) = p∕2 for all p < 1 , wT (1) = 1 , with wT the source function capturing 
the ambiguity attitude for the trust game. In all aforementioned models, the trustor is indifferent between 
gambling on either event R,M , or S , and they all have matching probability 1
6
 . The ambiguity aversion 
index is 1
2
 . Sensitivity has also been reduced, and the a-insensitivity index is also 1
2
.
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Case 4 [aversion to inequality and a-insensitivity]. Here b = 0.15. The trustor per-
ceives ambiguity. Now, because of ambiguity, she reckons more with deviations 
in both directions (favorable and unfavorable), rather than only with unfavorable 
directions as in Case 2. It is like increasing variance rather than decreasing expec-
tation. She assigns extra weight 0.25 to the favorable R, extra weight 0.25 to the 
unfavorable S, and only weight 0.50 to the expected utility of Case 2.17 The utility 
of trust is 0.25 × 5.9 + 0.25 × 15 + 0.50 × 9.9 = 10.18 > 10. Trust is chosen.
The four cases show how ambiguity attitudes can confound the analyses of social 
preferences. A researcher who does not reckon with ambiguity aversion in Case 3 
may confuse it with Case 2 and erroneously conclude that there is inequality aver-
sion. Similarly, Case 4 may be confused with Case 1 with the erroneous conclusion 
that there is no inequality aversion. Galizzi and Navarro-Martínez (2017) reported 
negative findings on the external validity of social preference models in game the-
ory. Correcting for ambiguity attitudes may help to improve the case.
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